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FUCKING WITH DIGNITY: PUBLIC SEX, QUEER INTIMATE 
KINSHIP, AND HOW THE AIDS EPIDEMIC BATHHOUSE 




On Friday, March 11, 2016, just before Nancy Reagan’s funeral be-
gan, Hillary Clinton offered an unprompted assessment of the former first-
lady’s advocacy on AIDS: “It may be hard for your viewers to remember 
how difficult it was for people to talk about HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. And 
because of both President and Mrs. Reagan—in particular Mrs. Reagan—
we started a national conversation.”1 This comment unleashed a fury of 
rebukes on social media.2 Within hours, Clinton offered a brief apology.3
This “strange half-apology”4 hardly calmed the uproar, with some in the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (“LGBTQ”) communities 
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Foundation; he specializes in US constitutional law, American political development, and LGBTQ 
studies. He is most recently author of Fragmented Citizens: The Changing Landscape of Gay and 
Lesbian Lives (NYU Press 2016).
** Timothy S. Lyle is Assistant Professor of English at Iona College; he specializes in literary and 
cultural production and the intersections of queer theory, disability studies, and race studies. His work 
on HIV/AIDS most recently appears in the 50th Anniversary issue of African American Review (Johns 
Hopkins UP 2017).
1. Abby Phillip & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton Apologizes for Praising Nancy Reagan’s
Response to HIV/AIDS, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/03/11/hillary-clinton-apologizes-for-praising-nancy-reagans-response-to-hivaids/
[https://perma.cc/C8NH-S7K6].
2. Peter Staley’s response is illustrative: “Thank god I’m not a single issue voter, or she would 
have lost my vote with this insulting and farcical view of early AIDS history. Hillary just said that the 
Reagans helped start a “national conversation” about AIDS. WTF!!!!!” Mathew Rodriguez, Ronald and 
Nancy Reagan Ignored the AIDS Crisis and You Know It, Hillary Clinton, MIC (Mar. 11, 2016, 4:35 
PM), https://mic.com/articles/137718/ronald-and-nancy-reagan-ignored-the-aids-crisis-and-you-know-
it-hillary-clinton#.kXEj2Ek5p [https://perma.cc/9BTA-2FVR].
3. Phillip & Gearan, supra note 1.
4. David Atkins, How Clinton’s Reagan-AIDS Gaffe Helps Explain Why Populism Is Rising,
WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 12, 2016, 1:31 PM), http://washingtonmonthly.com/2016/03/12/how-clintons-
reagan-aids-gaffe-helps-explain-why-populism-is-rising/ [https://perma.cc/5F9X-QX9S].
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calling it “making matters far worse.”5 On Saturday, Clinton issued a sec-
ond statement that more fully recognized the history of LGBTQ activism to 
combat HIV as well as offered a set of policy proposals that would guide 
her potential presidential administration’s aims of eradicating HIV.6 She
called her praise of the Reagans “a mistake, plain and simple.”7 Her initial 
gaffe and her responses raise a set of questions. Why did her original 
statement provoke such anger, frustration, and pain? Why was her first 
apology considered insufficient? Why was the second apology considered 
better?
Clinton’s unwarranted praise of the Reagans on HIV/AIDS activism, 
the limits of her first apology, and her expanded second apology lay bare 
the dynamics of how dignity can be taken and the efforts by which it may 
be restored through apology, accountability, and action. To erase the efforts 
of LGBTQ persons who had worked tirelessly to respond to the HIV/AIDS 
crisis, to offer praise to the individuals who ignored, if not exacerbated, the 
crisis, and to call this revisionism an error of misspeaking all assaulted the 
dignity of LGBTQ communities. Her original statement about the Reagans 
perpetuated the “painful experience of non-recognition that lesbians and 
gay men sometimes experience in heteronormative society,” which sociol-
ogist Deborah Gould names “social annihilation”8 and which is evidenced 
by the simple fact that President Reagan refused to even publicly mention 
the disease until 1987.9 Overall, the Clinton fiasco reflects a broader legacy 
of denying gay men’s dignity within the context of the HIV/AIDS epidem-
ic.
Socio-legal scholar Bernadette Atuahene’s notions of “dignity taking” 
and “dignity restoration” provide some analytical leverage to make sense of 
the emotions triggered by Clinton’s statement and subsequent apologies. 
Atuahene contends that dignity takings are “when a state directly or indi-
rectly destroys property or confiscates various property rights from owners 
or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumaniza-
5. Kevin Naff, Hillary’s Painful Mistake, WASH. BLADE (Mar. 14, 2016, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2016/03/14/hillarys-painful-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/LXU5-
VJKV].
6. Hillary Clinton, On the Fight Against HIV and AIDS—and on the People Who Really Started 




8. DEBORAH GOULD, MOVING POLITICS: EMOTION AND ACT UP’S FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 58 
(2009).
9. JENNIFER BRIER, INFECTIOUS IDEAS: U.S. POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE AIDS CRISIS 7
(2009).
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tion or infantilization.”10 Dignity restoration is “a remedy that seeks to 
provide dispossessed individuals and communities with material compensa-
tion through processes that affirm their humanity and reinforce their agen-
cy.”11 Atuahene moves the concept of takings beyond its traditional 
connection with property and with private ownership. First, takings not 
only deprive individuals or communities of physical property but they also 
rob people of dignity in that the confiscation creates or perpetuates both 
dehumanization or a “failure to recognize an individual or group’s humani-
ty” and infantilization or a “restriction of an individual’s or group’s auton-
omy based on the failure to recognize and respect their full capacity to 
reason.”12 The taking assaults the dignity of the individual who is connect-
ed with the confiscated property. Second, a taking may affect more than 
just the owner of the property. Individuals who utilize the property as a 
critical site for self-, cultural-, and community-development can also be 
affected by the confiscation.
This article explores these dynamics of offense, apology, and restora-
tion as they are evident in a particular episode of HIV/AIDS history: when, 
in the name of public health, municipal authorities in San Francisco and 
New York City pursued the closure of gay bathhouses in 1984 and 1985, 
respectively. This paper does not contend that the bathhouses should not 
have been shut down. Instead, we seek to show how the debate and pro-
cesses that followed violated the dignity of gay men by 1) seeking to blame 
them for the epidemic, 2) ignoring community-based efforts to regulate the 
baths, and 3) refusing to engage in the queer logics that articulated the 
communal value of these spaces. To entertain any notion that closures 
damaged the gay community and psyche, we must resist the urge to pathol-
ogize public, anonymous, casual sex. As queer theorist Tim Dean reminds 
us, while “it would be a mistake to idealize gay sex institutions as utopian 
spaces liberated from the conflicts that permeate the world outside their 
walls,” we can still posit “that institutions sponsoring such play should not 
be considered automatically as pathological spaces.”13 These complicated, 
dynamic spaces were very much a part of a vibrant, safe, and prideful gay 
10. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Tak-
ings as a Sociolegal Concept].
11. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical 
Framework to Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 818 (2016).
12. Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 10, at 178–79.
13. TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING 35
(2009).
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male sexual culture; they contributed to the development of emotional em-
powerment and were a site of community-building.
Even as gay bathhouses had always been subject to state harassment 
under the guise of public morals regulation, this moral panic took on new 
urgency during the early years of the HIV crisis.14 Often, public officials’ 
first response to the crisis was to invade community institutions as sites of 
the problem at the very time they were under-spending on HIV education, 
prevention, and resources.15 State policies revealed a desire to lay account-
ability for the crisis with gay men, who had long been considered threats to 
the state.16 The dominant historical narrative that justified these closings, 
which has been promoted by historians and public officials alike, has been 
ostensibly epidemiological: bathhouses were sites of unsafe sex, unsafe sex 
is linked to the transmission of HIV, and thus these institutions needed to 
be closed in the name of public health.17
While the protection of public health has long been understood as a 
legitimate government objective within the Anglo-American legal tradition, 
we still ask the following: can these closures be conceptualized as a dignity 
taking, and if so, how might that reconceptualization affect our understand-
ings of contemporary efforts to restore dignity, such as the use of dignity as 
the constitutional foundation to recognize same-sex marriage?18 To answer 
these questions, we challenge the dominant public health narrative by illus-
trating how bathhouses were critical sites of community development, in-
cluding community-based responses to the HIV epidemic and crucial 
spaces for queer kinship.19 We contend that these closures ruptured com-
14. See MARC STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 148 (2012). See generally 
FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S DEBATE ON 
HOMOSEXUALITY (2008).
15. See William J. Woods & Diane Binson, Public Health Policy and Gay Bathhouses, in GAY 
BATHHOUSES AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 1, 10 (William J. Woods & Diane Binson eds., 2012).
16. See generally MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); STEPHEN M. ENGEL, FRAGMENTED CITIZENS: THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIVES (2016).
17. See RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH 29–30 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1991). See generally Eric Rofes, Context is Everything: 
Thoughts on Effective HIV Prevention and Gay Men in the United States, 10 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM.
SEXUALITY, no. 3/4, 1998, at 133; GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF 
GAY MEN (1997); RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC (1987). 
18. See generally WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
19. Even as only eight trial or appellate decisions were brought by governing authorities in New 
York and San Francisco seeking to close establishments where public sex was alleged to have occurred, 
and clientele participated in only two of these (one in San Francisco and one in New York), this lack of 
participation suggests more about heteronormative mores in an era of homosexual oppression and the 
dominant public health narrative than about the value of these institutions to some within queer com-
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munities whereby “community members are dehumanized or infantilized, 
involuntarily uprooted, and deprived of the social and emotional ties that 
define and sustain them.”20 Because many, although not all, governing 
authorities neither considered the value of these institutions nor grappled 
with queer understandings of space, contact, intimacy, and belonging, 
many bathhouses were shut down. Others were unable to sustain them-
selves under the guidelines that obliterated the queer logics that defined 
these spaces. And this failure to engage with queer approaches to intimacy 
places inherent limits on what appear as contemporary efforts of dignity 
restoration for the gay and lesbian communities. These efforts, such as 
same-sex marriage, reinforce the very same heteronormative notions of 
privacy, sexual contact, and intimacy that privileged a narrow set of rela-
tionships and which underlay the political public health narrative that justi-
fied the bathhouse closures. In short, dignity restorative measures that rely 
upon and reinforce these heteronormative conceptions prove inadequate. 
Such measures reveal the limits of dignity, for they only reify the logic 
queers have always already fucked with well before HIV/AIDS.
II. THE QUEER LOGICS OF THE BATHHOUSE: HOW THE SYMBOL AND 
SITE CHALLENGED HETERONORMATIVE NOTIONS OF PRIVACY AND 
INTIMACY
While many bathhouses in urban centers were not for the purpose of 
men to seek out sexual encounters with each other, historian Alan Bérubé 
notes that, by the turn of the twentieth century, some became known as 
“favorite spots” where same-sex sexual relations were not discouraged, and 
other bathhouses were specifically created to attract gay men.21 He sug-
gests that these baths fostered a prideful gay male identity precisely be-
cause men would go to gay bathhouses rather than furtively seek out same-
sex encounters in establishments not intended for this activity: “At a time 
when no one was saying “gay is good,” the creation of an institution in 
which gay men were encouraged to appreciate each other was a major step 
toward gay pride.”22 Precisely because the gay baths were sites where the 
sex was understood by patrons as “overt expressions of homosexual inter-
est,” these establishments provided the space for men to socialize with one 
munities. See Scott Burris, Legal Aspects of Regulating Bathhouses: Cases from 1984 to 1995, in GAY 
BATHHOUSES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 15, at 131, 134–35.
20. Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 10, at 179. 
21. Allan Bérubé, The History of Gay Bathhouses, in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLITICS 
AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS ACTIVISM 190 (Dangerous Bedfellows et al. eds., 1996).
22. Id. at 195.
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another as identifiably gay men.23 The gay bathhouse took on even more 
symbolic value within the context of the 1970s post-Stonewall era of gay 
liberation, particularly as queer sex acts themselves were articulated as 
liberation from heteronormative constraints. The act of choosing non-
normative sex while watched and often affirmed by others, was, for many 
of these men, considered a liberating experience.24
Beyond this emotional impact, gay baths evolved during the 1970s to 
provide a wider array of non-sexual activities, attesting to their growing 
role in defining gay cultural practice. The Continental Baths on Manhat-
tan’s Upper West Side had a dance floor, a Saturday night cabaret, and a 
pool, as well as hosted entertainment by Bette Midler and Barry Manilow. 
Bathhouses scheduled movie nights where campy cult classics were 
screened. They hosted benefits for the Gay Activists Alliance and provided 
onsite STD testing; the New St. Mark’s Bath in the East Village also 
worked with the League of Women Voters to register gay men to vote in 
the 1984 election.25 The baths were sites of community and kinship for-
mation that included a variety of ways for gay and queer men to interact 
beyond the carnal encounter.
The debate over whether bathhouses should remain open, which de-
fined HIV policy discussion in San Francisco in 1984 and in New York 
City in 1985, failed to acknowledge this role that the baths played in com-
munity development. To better understand the functions and benefits of 
these public institutions for gay male communities and to assess why they 
were viewed as threatening by broader heteronormative publics, we must 
recognize how these institutions and the activities that occurred within 
them adopted specific queer logics of time/space, contact, intimacy, and 
kinship/cultural belonging.26 These queer understandings ruptured the con-
ventional orientations that bolster heteronormative logics of order, stability, 
and safety.27 Consequently, institutions that nourished oppositional queer 
logics had to be surveilled, critiqued, and snuffed for state authority to per-
sist. Whether our critical eye turns to the architecture, actions among bod-
ies, or activities housed within these spaces, what becomes clear is that the 
bathhouses served as what queer theorist Michael Warner calls a counter-
23. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF A 
GAY WORLD, 1890–1940 19–20, 207 (1994).
24. See Ira Tattleman, Speaking to the Gay Bathhouse: Communicating in Sexually Charged 
Spaces, in PUBLIC SEX/GAY SPACE 73 (William Leap ed., 1999).
25. Bérubé, supra note 21, at 200–06.
26. See generally JUDITH HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME AND PLACE: TRANSGENDER BODIES,
SUBCULTURAL LIVES (2005). 
27. See SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS, OTHERS (2006).
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public.28 Counterpublics are alternative spaces that probe and resist norma-
tivity to offer subordinated communities different possibilities and diver-
gent logics. Thus, these counterpublics are vital sites of contestation, 
possibility, and reformulation.29 And, this queer counterpublic of the bath-
house assumed vast importance, especially during such a fraught era for 
gay males and their fight to reclaim and nourish open, safe, and healthy 
expressions of sexuality; to build like-minded collectives; and to assert a 
stake in broader conceptualizations and deployments of public space.
A close examination of these counterpublics reveals how their patrons 
and supporters radically reconfigured what it means to inhabit public space 
or to perform “acceptable” publicness. Simply put, as the men who popu-
lated the bathhouses wrestled for their right to space and exhibited their 
determination to fuck boldly, they challenged the supposedly neat, tidy 
boundaries that separate “public” from “private,” and they spotlighted the 
problematic politics of taking up public space. Instead of hiding in the 
throes of sexual repression or attempting sexual expression in spaces that 
they considered unsafe or — worst — unavailable (like a “home”), they 
opted to venture into public space and to seek refuge in the bodies and the 
conversations of their like-minded peers.30 Where public space became the 
safe location for intimacy, where darkness and anonymity provided securi-
ty, and where personal nakedness provided the public foundation for com-
munity, the constitutional legal logic of heterosexual sexual privacy behind 
the bedroom door seemed hardly relevant to queer experience.
Gay and queer men’s interactions within the bathhouses also defied 
normative dictations of contact because they refused to observe social pro-
priety; in other words, bathhouse patrons engaged with one another’s bod-
ies without formal introductions, without the imperative to follow social 
protocol, without the expectation of monogamous commitment, and even 
without the promise of a protracted interaction beyond those immediate 
moments of pleasure and mutual exchange.31 In so doing, they demonstrat-
ed a divergent value system that rethinks how people negotiate what can 
happen in and through available physical space and how bodies can and 
should interact.
28. See generally MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS (2005) for further theori-
zations on performing publicness.
29. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE (1999). 
30. See Joseph Beam, Brother to Brother: Words from the Heart, in IN THE LIFE: A BLACK GAY
ANTHOLOGY 230–242 (Joseph Beam ed., 1986) (discussing constructions of “home” and “safety”). 
31. For both an account and an analysis of interpersonal contact in public sex institutions, see 
generally SAMUEL R. DELANEY, TIMES SQUARE RED, TIMES SQUARE BLUE (1999).
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To borrow from writer Samuel Delany, these men engaged “in think-
ing through the problem of where people—with their bodily, material, sex-
ual, and emotional needs—might discover (or even work to set up) varied 
and welcoming harbors.”32 As they developed these harbors, they created 
alternatives to heteronormative relationship-building and kinship formation 
to experience a cultural belonging that was not readily available elsewhere. 
Delany explains the possibilities of these sites of gay male contact and
details how they offer ethically sound democratic exchange.33 Interested in 
how and why people come together and what happens when they do or do 
not, Delaney delineates between contact and networking—the former a 
more organic, accidental interclass collision fraught with potential and the 
latter a calculated, ordered, and perhaps even stifled system of interaction 
that supports entrenched divisions among folks. Michael Rumaker similarly 
reflected on how nakedness produced a safety and camaraderie beyond 
identity within the Everard Baths:
Here, we were our naked selves, anonymous, wearing only our bodies, 
with no other identity than our bare skins, without estrangements of class 
or money or position, or false distinctions of any kind, not even names if 
chose none. Myself, the other naked men here, were the bare root of 
hunger and desire, our prime need to be held, touched and touching, feel-
ing, if only momentarily, the warmth and affectionate response of anoth-
er sensuous human. Here, was the possibility to be nourished and 
enlivened in the blood—heat and heartbeat of others, regardless of who 
or what we were. Nurturing others we nurture ourselves.34
Additionally, since the interactions do not demand or even regularly 
offer future commitment, they reformulate configurations of time in queer 
ways. Instead of experiencing time according to narratives of productivity 
and responsibility that align with the goals of the state and with capitalistic 
functionality, patrons of public sex institutions adopt and practice a kind of 
queer futurity.35 They probe, resist, and offer alternatives for how we un-
derstand time beyond reproductive logics and heteronormative standards—
children, marriage, and so on.36 Rather than take refuge in a seemingly 
stable fantasy of the future, queers frequenting public sex institutions could 
embrace an abandonment of order—the promise of a tomorrow. While 
queer time is often mischaracterized as immature, irresponsible, or even 
narcissistic, these temporal decisions amplify the possibility of an alterna-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. MICHAEL RUMAKER, A DAY AND A NIGHT AT THE BATHS 13 (1979).
35. LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE (2004).
36. HALBERSTAM, supra note 26, at 1–21.
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tive relationship to “progress” or a divergent relationship to constructions 
of time—how we calculate it, how we fill it, and how we measure its pro-
ductive usage.37
Of course, seeking contact with otherness—especially in public 
space—in non-normative time sequence is a fundamentally queer endeavor 
because it subverts a variety of normative discourses that delimit where 
bodies can go, when, and what they can accomplish.38 Thus, queer contact 
is often attacked and misrepresented as dangerous or irresponsible precisely 
because it threatens to rupture and dissolve the barriers that hegemonic 
structures police steadfastly to order bodies, actions, and discourses.39 A
conservative discourse of safety, i.e., public health, emerges to discourage 
such queer orientations. Without these subversive spaces that offer unme-
diated contact with otherness, patrons of these counterpublics ask when, 
where, and how to achieve the kind of contact that they deeply value and 
need. When gay men were already acculturated to distrust and suspect one 
another, the impairment or destruction of the physical spaces upon which 
contact depends left queer men without a fundamental resource.
III. HOW QUEERS MOBILIZED TO SAVE THE BATHHOUSE AMID THE 
CRISIS
Histories of the early HIV/AIDS crisis detail how gay men mobilized 
to understand, educate, and prevent disease transmission when governing 
authorities at the municipal, state, and federal level ignored the spreading 
epidemic. These histories, of which Randy Shilts’ And the Band Played On
is illustrative, characterize early AIDS activists, such as the writer Larry 
Kramer or Michael Callen and Richard Berkowitz, who together drafted the 
first safer sex manual, How to Sex in an Epidemic, as rejecting the sexual 
libertarianism associated with gay liberation and as advocating closures of 
the baths.40 Yet, these tellings leave underexplored the efforts many within 
the gay community employed to self-regulate the baths, partnering with 
these businesses to promote safer sex, and thereby maintaining an institu-
tion critical to gay identity and community. Indeed, Callen and Berkowitz’s 
publication of “Two Gay Men Declare War on Promiscuity,” in a Novem-
37. Id. at 152–88.
38. AHMED, supra note 27, at 1–24.
39. For the deployment of “danger” to police bodies, see generally SIMON WATNEY, PRACTICES 
OF FREEDOM: SELECTED WRITINGS ON HIV/AIDS (1994). 
40. Shilts writes of Kramer, “Larry Kramer was growing more militant in this stance . . . [to] tell 
people that, if they wanted to survive, they should just stop having sex.” SHILTS, supra note 17, at 210. 
See also LARRY KRAMER, REPORTS FROM THE HOLOCAUST: THE STORY OF AN AIDS ACTIVIST (1989). 
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ber 1982 edition of The New York Native is often cited as laying the foun-
dation for a community-based effort to close the baths and to curb the 
promiscuity with which baths were negatively associated.41 Callen and 
Berkowitz held to the reigning theory of the disease at the time, namely the 
multiple infections theory, which posited that through promiscuity, gay 
men compromised their immune systems by overexposure to common in-
fections. By provocatively claiming that “our lifestyle has created the pre-
sent epidemic of AIDS,” Callen and Berkowitz challenged key tenets of 
gay liberation and triggered a reply by Charles Jurist in the next issue of the 
Native. In his “In Defense of Promiscuity,” Jurist accused his fellow AIDS 
activists of “unleashing hysteria within our community.” Callen and 
Berkowitz, according to Jurist, declared war on gay liberation, shamed gay 
men, and called for a monogamy that aped heterosexual norms: “They 
seem to be saying that anything other than monogamy or sex restricted to 
two or three ongoing, tightly controlled relationships constitutes promiscui-
ty and ought to be avoided.”42 For Jurrist, Callen and Berkowitz denigrated 
the very queer ways of being that gay men invented as alternatives to com-
bat heteronormative oppression, to oppose the social structures of straight 
society.
Yet a closer reading of the Callen and Berkowitz essay suggests that 
fostering monogamy—
something that has been judicially endorsed in the battle for and ap-
proval of same-sex marriage in the United States—was not their objective. 
The authors stated, “We are not suggesting legislating an end to promiscui-
ty. Ultimately, it may be more important to let people die in the pursuit of 
their own happiness than to limit personal freedom by regulating risk.”43
Callen and Berkowitz advocated regulation over closure.44 And, deeply 
aware of the history of government raids of gay safe-spaces such as bars 
and baths, they favored community-led regulation over government imposi-
tion: “It would be preferable to avoid further governmental interven-
tions . . . . [Instead] the gay community must take responsibility of 
providing its members with clear and unequivocal warnings about the 
health risks of promiscuity.”45 In short, their call was less for monogamy 
than it was for a community-based response to the crisis before straight 
41. See generally Michael Callen & Richard Berkowitz, We Know Who We Are: Two Gay Men 
Declare War on Promiscuity, N.Y. NATIVE, Nov. 8–21, 1982, at 23.
42. See generally Charles Jurrist, In Defense of Promiscuity: Hard Questions about Real Life,
N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 6–19, 1982, at 27.
43. Callen & Berkowitz, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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government would invade and thereby undo the cultural gains made since 
Stonewall. It is this call for community-based action that is often lost when 
the bathhouse debate is limited to the tidy but limited dichotomy of liber-
tarianism versus public health. By drawing attention to the call and to the 
efforts that follow, both the extent of the dignity taking committed by gov-
ernment authorities and the politicized nature of the public health rationale 
become apparent.
Community organizations, such as the Gay Men’s Health Crisis 
(“GMHC”), produced educational materials that did not advocate bath-
house closure, but recommended safer-sex practices within the baths. By 
late 1983, AIDS activists in New York City, including Berkowitz, Callen, 
Keith Lawrence, Joseph Sonnabend, and Roger Erlow, among others, cre-
ated a Committee on Safer Sex. That committee established a subcommit-
tee on bars and baths, and their recorded meeting notes capture their efforts 
to establish community-based regulation of the baths. For example, notes 
from a December 30, 1983 meeting indicate that the goals include “educa-
tion” and “effective behavior modification not just in bars and baths.” They 
noted that GMHC was already working on an “info piece” to this end. 
There was acknowledgment of civil liberties, and Jim Fourratt noted a con-
cern that “baths just want business,” and that discussion of infection “must 
precede civil liberties.” Fourratt also suggested that the group needed to 
“look at lifestyles and the institutions that perpetuate them.” But David V. 
cautioned the group that whatever educational campaign or other actions to 
be developed could “not just [be] a physical approach” and that the group 
should avoid “jumping to conclusions on what’s going on in backrooms, 
etc.” And, emphasizing the ongoing fear and history of government inter-
vention, the notes stress that all actions to regulate the baths and attempts to 
educate for safer sex must be seen as a gay community initiative. Other-
wise, what “would be seen as govt [sic] intervention” would mean “politi-
cal death” of this group. Instead, it must be clear that this initiative is “gays 
helping gays.”46
The Committee on Safer Sex describes in a January 14, 1984 memo 
the development of six items for community education: 1. a bathhouse 
poster with pamphlets and phone numbers, 2. the same poster for 
“bookstores” and bars, 3. subway posters with the phone number of the 
subcommittee, 4. Posters for public places such as post offices, 5. Public 
service announcements on television and radio, and 6. other pamphlets that 
46. Notes from Meeting of the Bars & Baths Subcomm., Comm. on Safer Sex (Dec. 30, 1983) 
(on file with the LGBT Community Center National History Archive, New York AIDS Network, Keith 
Lawrence Papers, Record 77, Box 1, Folder 66).*
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lay out answers to basic questions like “what is the immune system?” and a 
glossary of AIDS terms. The committee emphasized that “pamphlets pro-
vided with poster will describe healthy low-risk sexual practices, give ap-
propriate phone numbers, etc.” The memo also indicated that the 
committee is seeking funding from the NYC health department via its Of-
fice of Gay and Lesbian Health Concerns, suggesting an early effort to 
partner with public health officials. The proposed mock-up for the poster 
embraced sex-positivity. In bold letters, it proclaimed, “SEX IS 
WONDERFUL!” and then below, it warned, “BUT DON’T LET AIDS 
KILL YOU!” It then laid out a set of high-risk activities to be avoided: 
“DON’T RIM, DON’T LET HIM COME IN YOUR ASS. MAKE SURE 
YOU DON’T COME IN HIS. DON’T COME IN HIS MOUTH, AND 
DON’T LET HIM COME IN YOURS.”47 This phrasing reaffirms the rela-
tional aspects of sexual encounter; it refutes the sexual libertarianism of 
individual pleasure, and reminds the reader that we must take care of one 
another. The poster affirms the importance of community, connection, and, 
indeed, brotherhood among gay men. The poster exemplifies what historian 
Jennifer Brier described as the richer notion of gay liberationism and how it 
enabled community response to AIDS: “The language of brotherhood also 
invoked a communal responsibility for AIDS that provided the grounds for 
men not blaming one another for the diseases that they had transmitted, 
knowingly, unknowingly, or in ignorance of the ultimate consequences.”48
The proposed mock-up became the GMHC poster, “Great Sex is Healthy 
Sex.” It reminded its viewer that “Great Sex is Healthy Sex.” Across the 
top, the poster read “Great Sex! Don’t Let AIDS Stop It.” And it included 
warnings against high-risk activities. It promoted the low-risk act with 
“Jacking off is hot and safe,” and it added “Affection is our best protec-
tion.”49 The final poster also dropped the threatening language of AIDS 
will kill you in favor of acknowledging the fear of AIDS but reminding the 
viewer that there were lots of ways to embrace a healthy sexuality.
By late February 1984, the subcommittee on baths and bars of the 
Committee on Safer Sex recommended a sequence of outreach efforts, 
beginning with working with the Community Council of Lesbian & Gay 
Organizations, then coordinating with the Greater Gotham Business Coun-
cil, and then hosting meetings with bar and bathhouse owners and manag-
ers. It would reach out to gay media, including the Advocate, the Native,
47. Memorandum from Comm. on Safer Sex (Jan. 16, 1984) (on file with the LGBT Community 
Center National History Archive, Joseph Sonnabend Papers, Record 120, Box 5, Folder 55).
48. BRIER, supra note 9, at 39.
49. Id. at 40–41.
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and NYC Gay News. The outreach “would update them on our current ef-
forts and intentions, to reiterate our invitation to participate in our efforts 
and meetings, and to seek their support in whatever ways they deem appro-
priate.”50 In short, gay men led an effort to educate one another about high-
risk and low-risk sexual activities, emphasizing that particular acts—not 
the location of those acts—were to be avoided.
In December of 1984, the Coalition for Sexual Responsibility 
(“CSR”), a group of “gay men interested in engaging establishments where 
on-site sex occurred in AIDS education/prevention efforts . . . [which] rep-
resented a wide spectrum of views, ranging from closing all establishments 
with on-premise sexual activity from making changes in how these busi-
nesses operated,” was established.51 In their interim report released in Oc-
tober 1985, the CSR listed its objectives as “encouraging commercial 
establishments whose primary purpose is to permit high-risk sexual activi-
ties to occur on their premises to provide an environment where safer sex is 
encouraged and promoted” and “encouraging these same establishments to 
help educate the community about AIDS and safer sex.”52 The report de-
fined these establishments as gay bathhouses, gay bars with “back rooms,” 
gay movie houses, and some gay bookstores where on-site sex occurred. 
Not listed among the CSR’s objectives was advocacy for closure. The CSR 
sought to prevent unsafe activities within these establishments; it did not 
seek to shut them down.53
The CSR developed nineteen educational, hygienic, and structural 
recommendations for the bathhouses. It then invited bathhouse owners and 
managers to a February 11, 1985 meeting facilitated by the directors of 
Lambda Legal Defense and the National Gay Task Force. The CSR noted 
in its interim report that it supported community self-regulation under the 
assumption that “if the government decided to regulate (including closure) 
the baths . . . [then] restaurants and other places frequented by gays where 
no on-premise sex occurs could become vulnerable to government regula-
tion.”54 The committee sought to enlist participation of the bathhouses out 
of a fear that if they “failed to comply with our modest recommendations 
50. Memorandum from Comm. on Safer Sex (Feb. 27, 1984) (on file with the LGBT Community 
Center National History Archive, Joseph Sonnabend Papers, Record 120, Box 5, Folder 55). 
51. See generally COAL. FOR SEXUAL RESPONSIBILITY, INTERIM REPORT (1985) (on file with the 
LGBT Community Center National History Archive, New York AIDS Network, Keith Lawrence 
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then they would be inviting government intervention by their action.”55 In
short, the CSR aimed to avoid direct government intervention, in part be-
cause such action had long been associated with repression and denigration 
of gay sexuality.
After receiving written consent from ten NYC bathhouses, the CSR 
organized a schedule of three inspections to be carried out by volunteers 
throughout 1985. Volunteers would enter the bathhouses armed with a 
clipboard and checklist of the CSR’s 19 recommendations and evaluate 
whether bathhouse owners were in compliance. On June 4, 1985, the CSR 
sent letters indicating “poor results and requesting that they take immediate 
remedial action.” The Committee convened a meeting with seven of the ten 
owners on June 13, which was followed by a letter to all bathhouses urging 
“full compliance as soon as possible.” A second round of inspections oc-
curred in June and July, which revealed that “while the results were some-
what better with some of the establishments there were still no 
establishments in full compliance.” There was also some resistance to the 
inspection regime. The Barracks refused to participate after the first inspec-
tion. The CSR then partnered with GMHC, and GMHC worked with the 
bathhouses to set up on-site tables where GMHC members could distribute 
safer sex pamphlets to patrons. The second round of inspections saw only 
modest improvements in compliance. The third round, which took place in 
October, again saw modest improvements, but noted only “full compliance 
in two of the ten bathhouses in the city.” The report concluded by noting 
that city and state authorities were now considering direct actions against 
the bathhouses and lamented that community efforts had fallen short. It did 
note that a majority of the NY AIDS Institute Advisory Board (discussed 
further in the next section) endorsed the CSR’s inspection regime be adopt-
ed by city and state officials rather than close the bathhouses entirely. But 
even the CRC concluded by noting, “the response from the bathhouses has 
been, for the most part, irresponsible and disappointing.”56
The aim of laying out all of this evidence of how gay men, in their at-
tempts to respond to the HIV crisis with little to no support from public 
authorities, developed methods of regulating bathhouse usage to educate 
men about HIV is to reveal how proactive the community, in fact, was. 
Furthermore, the community, early on and quite contrary to the government 
action described in the next section, distinguished between low and high-
risk sexual activities, recognizing that this approach would be far more 
55. Id.
56. Id.
2017] BATHHOUSE CLOSURES 975
effective than banning the baths and bars that were so critical to gay identi-
ty and community. The comprehensive regimes of inspection innovatively 
developed by community members, even as they were endorsed by some 
officials, were often disregarded by authorities. Instead, elected officials, in 
the debates that raged in San Francisco and New York City, painted gay 
men as depraved, oversexed animals incapable of responding to the crisis. 
In other words, the debates and the closures that followed did substantial 
cultural and political work to render gay men culpable for their own com-
munity’s sudden and relentless demise. Moreover, they were grounded in a 
long history of medicalization of homosexuality and a pervasive cultural 
tendency that would consider homosexuals either “sub persons” or refuse 
to consider homosexuality as a personhood status altogether.57 As such, 
these closures were part of a larger anti-gay and anti-HIV cultural discourse 
that dehumanized and infantilized men who have sex with other men. The 
bathhouse closings fostered and perpetuated a narrative of culpability, ig-
nited intense divisions within the gay and lesbian communities, and pro-
duced within gay men a deep distrust and even fear of governing 
institutions and of one another.
IV. THE MORALIZING PUBLIC HEALTH NARRATIVE:
INFANTILIZATION, DE-HUMANIZATION, AND CONFLATION OF QUEER SEX
WITH DISEASE
The debate over bathhouses spilled beyond the boundaries of the gay 
community as the AIDS epidemic raged in San Francisco and New York 
City. The bathhouses became an easy target for authorities who had 
dragged their heels on formulating a response to the crisis. Closing the 
bathhouses served at least three goals: 1) it was a visible action, and gov-
ernment officials could cite concrete steps taken against the disease, 2) it 
foisted blame for the epidemic on an already despised minority, and 3) it 
shut down institutions that straight majorities saw as neighborhood blight 
and impediments to economic development. Public officials long consid-
ered bathhouses a nuisance, and the public health rationale that was fully 
articulated in both cities by 1986 proved a seemingly apolitical basis to 
achieve moral imperatives against homosexuality.58 The narrative of public 
health ignored new discoveries about viral transmission, divided the queer 
community, and ultimately ignored all of the efforts already undertaken 
57. See BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 3 (2014).
58. See generally FEJES, supra note 14.
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within that community to regulate the bathhouses in the service of promot-
ing public health.
The debate over whether the bathhouses should remain open began in 
San Francisco and dominated that city’s public AIDS discourse during 
1984. It culminated with Dr. Mervyn Silverman, the city’s Director of the 
Department of Public Health (“SFDPH”) calling for their closure on Octo-
ber 9, 1984. NYC officials were stunned by San Francisco’s actions. These 
officials contended, at the time, that such action either violated privacy 
rights or would simply fail to achieve the stated objective of curbing the 
spread of HIV.59 Ironically, a year later, they would follow in San Francis-
co’s footsteps.
Early on in San Francisco’s public debate, Silverman maintained that 
it was “inappropriate and in fact illegal for me to close down all bathhouses 
and other such places” and that such action would “insult the intelligence 
of many of our citizens, and it would be an invasion of their privacy . . . .” 
Instead, he advocated that the DPH work with the baths and gay communi-
ty leaders “to educate the public, both gay and straight” about how the dis-
ease was spread.60 By mid-1984, the San Francisco AIDS Foundation 
released a chart that ran in gay newspapers throughout San Francisco, 
which categorized various sex acts as either “safe,” “possibly safe,” or 
“unsafe.”61 In April of 1984, scientists announced they had discovered the 
viral agent that caused AIDS, what would be named HIV in 1986.62 As
such, the multiple infections theory that often justified bathhouse closure 
was undercut. Nevertheless, that same month, Silverman took a different 
position, announcing on April 9, that “all sexual activity between individu-
als [is to] be eliminated in public facilities in San Francisco where the 
transmission of AIDS is likely to occur.” This ban was aimed at those loca-
tions—baths, backrooms of adult bookstores, and sex clubs— where men 
could “indulge in multiple sexual encounters.”63 Silverman’s reversal fol-
lowed meetings with Mayor Diane Feinstein, who, the San Francisco Ex-
59. See generally Peg Byron & Steve C. Arvanette, New York Shocked by Proposed S.F. Bath 
Ban, N.Y. NATIVE, Apr. 9–22, 1984, at 51.
60. Christopher Disman, The San Francisco Bathhouse Battles of 1984: Civil Liberties, AIDS 
Risk, and Shifts in Health Policy, in GAY BATHHOUSES AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY, supra note 15, at
80 (2012) (letter from Dr. Mervyn Silverman to Littlejohn dated May 10, 1983).
61. AIDS-Awareness Chart, San Francisco AIDS Foundation, Mid-1984, which ran in local San 
Francisco gay newspapers in 1984 and 1985, listed a range of 21 sexual practices and rated them as 
either “safe”, “possibly safe,” or “unsafe.” Id.
62. SHILTS, supra note 17, at 448–51.
63. Press Release, Dr. Mervyn Silverman, Director, S.F. Dep’t of Pub. Health (April 9, 1984) (on 
file with the LGBT Community Center National History Archive, Joseph Sonnabend Papers, Record 
120, Box 4, Folder 60). Accord SHILTS, supra note 17, at 446.
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aminer revealed in a May 1984 issue, had ordered on-duty plainclothes 
police officers to pose as bathhouse patrons to gather information about the 
sexual activities that took place within.64 Within two months of the April 9 
announcement, four bathhouses in San Francisco—the Liberty Baths, the 
Catacombs, the Caldron, and the Sutro Baths—closed their doors. Others 
challenged the ban with an ad that ran in the local gay press, declaring 
“baths . . . not the problem but part of the solution.” 65 The baths could 
promote safer sex awareness and activities among gay men.
City officials were at cross-purposes. In August, the city’s Human 
Rights Commission unanimously adopted a resolution opposing any prohi-
bition or regulation of “private consensual sexual activity in any bathhouse 
or sex establishment, absent a showing that it is a necessary and essential 
measure supported by clear and convincing medical and epidemiological 
evidence.” Attesting to the growing awareness of the viral agent theory and 
calling for more nuance than a blanket ban, the Commission noted that 
“health professionals cite types of sexual behavior, and not location, as the
causative factors in the transmission of AIDS.”66 To satisfy this demand, 
Silverman hired four private investigators to document the goings-on with-
in six bathhouses, four sex clubs, two adult bookstores, and two adult thea-
ters in September 1984.67 According to historian Ronald Bayer, these 
reports “achieved the desired impact. Whatever the actual tabulations of 
safe, unsafe, and possibly safe acts observed might have revealed, the de-
scriptions portrayed the existence of activity that would serve to shock the
sensibilities of the conventional and disturb those concerned with the 
transmission of a deadly disease.”68
On October 9, 1984, Silverman ordered fourteen baths to close: 
“These businesses have been inspected on a number of occasions and 
demonstrate a blatant disregard for the health of their patrons and of the 
community. . . . Make no mistake about it: These fourteen establishments 
are not fostering gay liberation. They are fostering disease and death.”69
The statement captures how officials only understood the baths as commer-
cial enterprises; their role in fostering community and their potential to 
promote public health went unacknowledged. Bathhouse patrons were to be 
monitored by the state as they were incapable of responsible action, i.e., 
64. Disman, supra note 60, at 99.
65. Id. at 93.
66. See generally Human Rights Commission Opposes Bathhouse ‘Sex Ban’, BAY AREA REP.,
Aug. 30, 1984.
67. Disman, supra note 60, at 106.
68. BAYER, supra note 17, at 44. 
69. SHILTS, supra note 17, at 489.
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infantilized, as unable to protect themselves and were primarily viewed as 
disease carriers, i.e., de-humanized.
Silverman’s ban was stopped by a preliminary injunction from Judge 
Roy Wonder, who ruled that the baths could remain open “as long as they 
contained no private rooms operated without a hotel license, and removed 
the doors of their rooms, booths, and video cubicles. The baths were also to 
employ at least one monitor for an average of every twenty patrons, who 
would circulate every ten minutes, watching for ‘high-risk sexual behavior’ 
as the phrase was defined by the AIDS Foundation, and expelling patrons 
who engaged in it.”70 Wonder’s injunction shifted the emphasis from loca-
tion to sex acts as the appropriate public health concern. Nevertheless, the 
proposed regime of surveillance smacked of infantilization; it assumed gay 
men were incapable of altering their behavior unless compelled by the 
watchful eye of the state. It also illustrated how public officials never con-
sidered bathhouses to be valuable or valued institutions. As the defense 
lawyer for the bathhouses, Merial Burtle pointed out, “the city is taking 
advantage of a certain distaste that some straight people have for gay 
sex . . . many straight people are tolerant of gays as long as they don’t have 
to think about or read about what they do in bed.”71 This “ick” factor is the 
foundation for the de-humanization that is a hallmark of dignity-taking.72
Additionally, the surveillance undercut the spatial logics of desire and 
anonymity that provided the safety that made the baths valuable. The oper-
ating logic of the bathhouse is “the notion of drift [which] is essential to the 
experience of a sex club, where fluidity facilitates passing into an aimless 
‘let’s see what happens’ state of mind . . . [where] one browses, in search of 
something vaguely determined.”73 Queer theorist Leo Bersani notes that the 
bathhouse created a safety precisely because “in addition to the opportunity 
anonymous sex offers its practitioners of shedding much of the personality 
that individuates them psychologically, the common bathhouse uniform—a
towel—communicates very little . . . about our social personality.”74 This 
safety was no longer possible in a context of bright lights and roaming 
monitors. In short, support for the bathhouse closure was premised on the 
70. Disman, supra note 60, at 112.
71. Michael Helquist & Rick Osmon, The City vs. The Sex Businesses, COMING UP!, Nov. 1984.
72. As Gary Mucciaroni writes, “The ‘ick factor’ reflects the taboo of gay sex, much of it fed by 
centuries of religious injunctions against sexual conduct between same-sex partners.” GARY 
MUCCIARONI, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT POLITICS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE STRUGGLES OVER GAY
RIGHTS 23–24 (2008).
73. John Lindell, Public Space for Public Sex, in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLITICS AND 
THE FUTURE OF AIDS ACTIVISM, supra note 21, at 73, 75.
74. LEO BERSANI, Sociability and Cruising, in IS THE RECTUM A GRAVE?: AND OTHER ESSAYS
45, 60 (2010).
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notion that “anonymity and impersonal contact,” so crucial to the libera-
tionist ethos of the 1970s, had “become deplorable as sexual values in the 
1980s.”75
When the public debate in San Francisco had seemingly reached its 
conclusion, it was just beginning in NYC. Just as in San Francisco, NYC 
officials did not initially favor a ban.76 David Sencer, the New York City 
Health Commissioner, opposed banning the bathhouses.77 A variety of 
physicians who played critical roles in the treatment of AIDS patients and 
the development of AIDS policy in NYC, including Joseph Sonnabend, 
Lawrence Mass, Alvin Friedman-Kein, and Stephen Ciazza, also opposed 
blanket bathhouse bans.78 And, in 1985, Gay Men’s Health Crisis came out 
forcefully against closure. The GMHC maintained that the gay community 
itself was responsible enough to self-regulate; it thereby refuted the ongo-
ing criticisms implicit in governing officials’ and others’ support for the 
ban that gay men were simply incapable of responsible behavior.79
In February 1985, the New York State Department of Health estab-
lished the Bathhouse Subcommittee to consider whether the state should 
take action. The committee included Dr. Stephen Caiazza, Michael Callen, 
GMHC member Robert Lee Cecchi, Richard Failla, a New York state 
Judge, Dr. Jeff Laurence, Dr. Mathilde Krim, who was chair of the AIDS 
Medical Foundation, and David Leven, who would chair the committee.80
The committee released its findings in June 1985. The committee, like the 
San Francisco Human Rights Commission, opposed closure. According to 
the Subcommittee, “state closure of the bathhouses is simply a means of 
controlling and regulating consensual sexual relations between gay men, 
and there is not currently a compelling need so great to justify government 
interference of this magnitude.”81 Furthermore, the committee was con-
cerned with a slippery slope: should the bathhouses be shut down, “then, 
75. Yannick LeJacq, Love Becomes Possible: The Transformation of Gay Male Sexuality and 
Identity in the AIDS Crisis 98 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University), 
http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1775&context=etd_hon_theses 
[https://perma.cc/2ZQL-V343].
76. See generally Edward Koch, The Mayor Responds, N.Y. NATIVE, July 15–28, 1985.
77. Joyce Purnick, AIDS and the State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/30/nyregion/aids-and-the-state.html [https://perma.cc/FAD5-HPXE].
78. See generally Lawrence Mass, Cancer in the Gay Community, N.Y. NATIVE, July 27–Aug. 9, 
1981, at 1.
79. See generally David France, Albany Creates Bathhouse Sub-Committee, N.Y. NATIVE, July 
1–14, 1985.
80. Letter from Paul Moore, Jr., Bishop of N.Y., to David Leven (Feb. 8, 1985) (on file with the 
LGBT Community Center National History Archive, Joseph Sonnabend Papers, Record 120, Box 4, 
Folder 60) (listing full committee membership).
81. France, supra note 79.
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perhaps, few obstacles would exist to further regulation of such relations in 
other locations, perhaps even in private homes.”82 Nevertheless, the com-
mission did recommend that the bathhouse owners should post safer-sex 
information, maintain hygienic conditions, provide condoms, and ensure 
adequate lighting. In fact, in an April 1985 memo outlining the Subcommit-
tee’s likely recommendations, the Subcommittee adopted the full nineteen 
recommendations from the Coalition for Sexual Responsibility. The state 
agency essentially coopted the community’s efforts at self-regulation. Ac-
cording to David Leven, author of this memo, “this statement is almost 
identical to the draft proposal of the Coalition for Sexual Responsibility, 
except that the language is suggestive rather than mandatory. The [CSR]
statement simply makes recommendations. It does not require anything.”83
Leven maintained that the community efforts had failed and that “the bath-
houses, to date, have not voluntarily taken reasonable steps which might 
lead to a decrease in the spread of AIDS.”84 Note that this assessment con-
tradicts the community-organized Coalition for Sexual Responsibility’s 
findings, which documented increasing compliance over time, even as full 
compliance was not achieved. Consequently, Leven contended that “the 
time has come to strongly recommend responsible government action.”85
In late October 1985, the New York State Public Health Council ap-
proved an emergency addition to the state Sanitary Code. One new section, 
24-2.2, stated that “No establishment shall make facilities available for the 
purpose of sexual activities where anal intercourse, vaginal intercourse or 
fellatio take place. Such facilities shall constitute a threat to the public 
health.” And section 24-2.3 provided that “the State Health Commissioner, 
local health officers and local boards of health may close any such facilities 
or establishments as constituting a public nuisance.”86 Similar to Silver-
man’s blanket ban in San Francisco, Section 24-2.2 employed a circular 
logic by defining the baths to be a public health threat and by empowering 
public officials to close all public health threats. It contained no acknowl-
edgement that these institutions could be anything other than a threat to the 
public and that the activities within them could be anything other than 
82. Id.
83. Memorandum from David C. Leven to the AIDS Advisory Council, Subcomm. on Bathhous-
es, Subject: Recommendations (Apr. 5, 1985) (on file at the LGBT Community Center National History 
Archive, Joseph Sonnabend Papers, Record 120, Box 4, Folder 60).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Mark E. Elovitz & P.J. Edwards, The D.O.H. Papers: Regulating Public Sex in New York 
City, in POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS ACTIVISM, supra note 21,
at 295, 299.
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spreading contagion. Furthermore, the provision, like the San Francisco 
ban, made no distinction between high-risk and low-risk activities. The 
measure ignored the recommendations of the AIDS Advisory Council’s 
bathhouse subcommittee and contemporary medical science.
Bathhouse owners attempted to comply with the new directive. Bruce 
Mailman, the owner of the New St. Mark’s Baths, provided condoms, safer 
sex information, and required patrons to sign a pledge indicating they 
would observe guidelines banning oral and anal sex.87 Nevertheless, Mail-
man opposed the state’s emergency measure, editorializing in the New York 
Times that closure served no health purpose as unsafe sex would occur 
elsewhere, that the state violated the constitutional privacy rights of his 
clientele, and that the policy focused on location rather than regulate sex 
acts: the policy “fails to distinguish between safe and unsafe sex, the 
amendment takes us a step backward in the highly successful educational 
effort that we and other responsible establishments have undertaken.” He 
castigated Axelrod: “What he’s doing isn’t medical. It’s political. He’s 
using the office of the health department as a political forum.”88
Mailman’s editorial was published a month after the New York State 
Supreme Court issued the first order to close a bathhouse, the Mineshaft.89
City inspectors who surveilled the Mineshaft reported witnessing anal in-
tercourse (as well as the distribution of condoms). They reported hearing 
whips (hardly surprising as this establishment catered to men interested in 
sadomasochism). Mayor Koch’s assessment of the findings degraded queer 
sex: “It’s tough stuff to read. It must be horrific, horrendous in its actuality 
to witness.”90 On November 7, 1985, when the injunction to close the 
Mineshaft was issued, Koch applauded the court order for “bring[ing] to 
the consciousness of those who have a predilection to engage in this suicid-
al behavior how ridiculous it is. Maybe it will deter them as well. We don’t 
know. But we’re going to do the best we can.”91
87. See generally Darrel Yates & Barry Adkins, State to Regulate Gay Sex, N.Y. NATIVE, Nov. 
4–10, 1985.
88. Bruce Mailman, The Battle for Safe Sex in the Baths, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/05/opinion/the-battle-for-safe-sex-in-the-baths.html 
[https://perma.cc/39E2-T3N6].
89. Joyce Purnick, City to Seeks to Close AIDS-Risk Place, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/07/nyregion/city-seeks-to-close-aids-risk-place.html 
[https://perma.cc/YC27-T4HD]; Barry Adkins, Judge Orders Mine Shaft Closed, N.Y. NATIVE, Nov. 
18–24, 1985.
90. Joyce Purnick, City Closes Bar Frequented by Homosexuals, Citing Sexual Activity Linked to 
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/08/nyregion/city-closes-bar-
frequented-by-homosexuals-citing-sexual-activity-linked-to-aids.html [https://perma.cc/2LKQ-UFYW].
91. Id.
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Less than two weeks later, the New York City Council passed Resolu-
tion 1685A, which directed Commissioner Sencer to “close down bath-
houses and other public heterosexual and homosexual establishments 
which make facilities available for certain high risk practices . . . known to 
contribute to the spread of AIDS.”92 Since the Resolution reiterated what 
Section 24-2 already provided, it had no real effect other than putting 
Sencer, who continued to oppose closure, in an untenable position. On 
December 4, 1985, Sencer announced he would resign on January 3, 
1986.93 Two days later, the New York State Supreme Court closed the St. 
Mark’s Baths.94 The closure order came one day after the St. Mark’s pro-
prietor, Mailman, published his criticism of the emergency measure.
That closure was based on inspections held between November 2 and 
December 4, 1985, which described banned activities occurring on the 
premises. The New York Native characterized the evidence as circumstan-
tial. The report even acknowledged inconclusive evidence: “I could not 
observe any activity as the door was closed” and “several used condoms 
[were] on the floor.”95 On December 16, signaling his complete reversal on 
the issue, much as San Francisco’s Silverman had done, Mayor Koch, 
when asked if he would continue to close bathhouses, replied, “I hope so. 
We are monitoring institutions which, we believe, are allowing unsafe 
health practices to continue.”96 On January 6, 1986, just over a year since 
the public debate began, the city sought an injunction to close the St. 
Mark’s Baths for up to a year.97 Despite repeated appeals, which often rest-
ed on patrons’ constitutional right to privacy, the St. Mark’s Bath never 
reopened.98 Affirming the state’s complete lack of comprehension of queer 
notions of privacy, autonomy, and safety developed in the context of the 
bathhouse and public sex, the New York Supreme Court ruling against the 
92. See generally John A. Fall, Council Passes Bathhouse Resolution, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 2–8, 
1985; Sarah Schulman, Committee Resolve Close Baths, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 2–8, 1985, at 11.
93. See generally Barry Adkins, Sencer Resigns, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 16–22, 1985.
94. John A. Fall, City Moves to Close St. Marks Baths, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 16–22, 1985; John A. 
Fall, St. Marks Baths Closed, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 23–29, 1985 [hereinafter Fall, St. Marks Baths 
Closed]; Joyce Purnick, City Shuts a Bathhouse as Site of ‘Unsafe Sex’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/07/nyregion/city-shuts-a-bathhouse-as-site-of-unsafe-sex.html
[https://perma.cc/6XPZ-ZXWQ].
95. Fall, St. Marks Baths Closed, supra note 94.
96. See generally Sarah Schulman, Koch Requests Action on Health Services and Insurance, N.Y.
NATIVE, Jan. 27–Feb. 2, 1986.
97. Barry Adkins, Bad News for St. Marks, N.Y. NATIVE, Jan. 20–26, 1986; City of New York v. 
New St. Mark’s Baths, 562 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div. 1986).
98. City of New York v. New St. Mark’s Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aff’d, 505 
N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div. 1986); City of New York v. New St. Mark’s Baths, 562 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. 
Div. 1990); City of New York v. New St. Mark’s Baths, 572 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1991).
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St. Marks Baths refuted the privacy claim by relying on liberal heteronor-
mative conceptions of the private sphere: “it is by no means clear that de-
fendant’s rights will, in actuality, be adversely affected in a constitutionally 
recognized sense by closure of St. Mark’s. The privacy protection of sexual 
activity conducted in a private home does not extend to commercial estab-
lishments simply because they provide an opportunity for intimate behavior 
or sexual release.”99
Just over a year later, with the Mineshaft, the St. Mark’s, and the 
Evarard Baths all closed, Commissioner Axelrod declared, “Today, many 
of the baths openly encourage safe-sex practices. And based on our obser-
vations, dangerous sexual activities are no longer being encouraged and, in 
fact, are not occurring. We believe the remaining bathhouses have acted 
very responsibly.”100 By 1987, four bathhouses remained open, and none 
were in violation of sanitation measure 24-2. All had posted signage adver-
tising safer sex practices, hosted workshops and showed films on such 
practices, and distributed condoms. Axelrod’s claim that the bathhouses 
acted responsibly, only after the state action, tellingly ignores that many of 
these same bathhouses were operating with the same safer-sex measures in 
place via community self-policing that preceded state action. Importantly, 
the compliance rates that the New York State Health Commissioner had 
achieved were not remarkably different than those of the community-based 
efforts; community efforts recognized these same four bathhouses were 
complying with safer-sex measures at the time of their own inspections.101
In short, the state may have accomplished little other than erasing the ac-
tions that gay community members had already taken by themselves and 
ultimately claiming the community’s accomplishment as its own. The pro-
cesses of dignity-taking that involve infantilization are in full view.
V. THE LIMITS OF DIGNITY: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FAILS AS DIGNITY
RESTORATION
If the bathhouse closures can be considered a dignity taking, then we 
must ask if dignity restoration is possible and of what it might entail. Dig-
nity, as a legal concept, has been the foundation of much U.S. pro-gay 
rights jurisprudence. While the Supreme Court’s decisions beginning with 
Lawrence v. Texas and culminating most recently in Obergefell v. Hodges
99. New St. Mark’s Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 982–83.
100. Scott Bronstein, 4 New York Bathhouses Still Operate Under City’s Program of Inspections,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/03/nyregion/4-new-york-bathhouses-still-
operate-under-city-s-program-of-inspections.html [https://perma.cc/2PTV-UVCX].
101. See COAL. FOR SEXUAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 51.
984 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:3
could be understood as “dignity-restorative”—indeed, legal scholar Dale 
Carpenter characterized Lawrence to be “as close as the Court would ever 
get to an apology to gay and lesbian Americans for the wrong, and for the 
harm, it had done to them”102— these rulings ultimately fail to compensate 
for the takings embodied in the bathhouse closures.103 They fail because 
they refuse to engage with queer values. Insofar as the Supreme Court’s 
gay rights jurisprudence premises dignity upon the state’s reinforcement of 
heteronormative, and often private, couplings, they deny the history and 
value of more radical ways of being.
On June 27, 2015, the New York Times ran the banner headline 
“EQUAL DIGNITY” across its front page. The phrase was taken from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down 
state bans on same-sex marriage. By pursuing a right to marry, “They ask 
for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that 
right.”104 The Obergefell decision invoked the phrase “equal dignity” twice. 
The phrase, “equal dignity,” was utilized once in United States v. Windsor,
the 2013 ruling that struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act.105
The word “dignity” appeared twice in Lawrence, nine times in Windsor and
nine times in Obergefell.
Writing for the majority in Windsor, Justice Anthony Kennedy stipu-
lated that when the state recognizes marriage, it “confer[s] upon them a 
dignity and status of immense import.”106 He considered New York’s deci-
sion to recognize same-sex marriage as constituting “further protection and 
dignity to that bond,” and that it represented a determination by the state 
that same-sex couples were “worthy of dignity in the community equal 
with all other marriages.”107 He argued that marriages “enhance the dignity 
and integrity of the person,” which DOMA denies.108 Finally, he declared
the statute invalid because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose 
102. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 259 (2012).
103. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In 
another working essay, we explore why increased access to Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis or PrEP may also 
fail as a measure of dignity restoration. Just as evaluating how the bathhouse closures constitute a 
dignity-taking has compelled us to re-evaluate the limited dignity-restorative potential of same-sex 
marriage recognition, so too does it compel us to consider advocacy of PrEP. While the FDA approval 
of the medication offers much to celebrate and plenty about which to theorize, similar heteronormative 
complications and governmental regulations are evident in the approval and prescription of PrEP. 
104. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
105. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
106. Id. at 2681.
107. Id. at 2692.
108. Id. at 2694.
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and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”109
On June 26, 2015, the second anniversary of Windsor and the twelfth 
anniversary of Lawrence, the Court, led by Kennedy, ruled in Obergefell.
And just as in Lawrence and Windsor, Kennedy again premised this ruling 
on claims to dignity; he said that marriage “always has promised nobility 
and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.”110 He
detailed how marriage has transformed over time to recognize the “equal 
dignity” of women in cross-sex marriages.111 He defined state recognition 
of marriage as a “basic dignity.”112 And, he characterized the petitioners as 
“ask[ing] for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants 
them that right.”113
The rhetoric of these decisions, for those of us who have fought for 
LGBT equality before the law, is uplifting. And yet the parameters of dig-
nity as Kennedy defines it are potentially quite narrow. Writing prior to 
Obergefell, legal scholar Noa Ben-Asher contended that Windsor “com-
pleted a three-decade transformation of the legal homosexual from an indi-
vidual whose sexual conduct the state could punish as morally 
blameworthy, to a couple whose marriage the State can find ‘worthy of 
dignity.’”114 Ben-Asher criticizes the “dignity” that is articulated in Wind-
sor—and that is re-stated in Obergefell—as weak because the Court does 
not see dignity as inherent in the individual, but a status conferred and rein-
forced by state recognition and because the Court determines that non-
recognition of same-sex relationships by the state constitutes injury and 
humiliation.115
To suggest that dignity is conferred by the state through marriage 
recognition implies that those who are unmarried are somehow not fully 
dignified, or, alternatively, that certain relationships must be privileged 
above others. Certain forms of connection and kinship-making go unrecog-
nized and are debased. Insofar as the kinds of connections at the heart of a 
queer ethic of public sex—anonymous, present, and momentary—embrace 
a sense of time and space antithetical to the supposed commitment inherent 
in marriage, the reification of marriage within LGBT communities counters 
109. Id. at 2696.
110. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
111. Id. at 2596.
112. Id. at 2606.
113. Id. at 2608.
114. Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 243, 245 (2014).
115. Id. at 246.
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queer logics. Marriage recognition is, in other words, the legal means to 
transform the transgressive potential of queer politics into a narrow notion 
of homonormativity.116 The dignity of queer relations remains unrecog-
nized, and even as we may recognize the momentous achievement that 
marriage recognition represents as a constitutional matter, the correspond-
ing privileging of marriage perpetuates the indignity of refusing to recog-
nize queer logics of intimacy.
VI. CONCLUSION: MODELS OF DIGNITY RESTORATION
By considering the bathhouse as a dynamic community institution, we 
have re-examined the public debate around their closures. Rather than pit 
moralizing public health against civil libertarianism and privacy right, we 
not only maintained that bathhouses were community institutions that could 
serve the public health—an argument that many gay rights advocates and 
medical professionals made throughout the closure debates—but also that 
these public commercial establishments provided safety and anonymity 
when oppressive regimes of homosexual criminalization reigned and when 
daily life was replete with aggression toward gay men. As such, they facili-
tated intimacy that transgressed the liberal jurisprudential tradition of con-
stitutional privacy and individual right as it had been taking shape since the 
1960s, a concept which relied on heteronormative boundaries between 
private and public space. As the HIV/AIDS crisis decimated gay male 
communities in San Francisco and New York, many gay men worked to 
retain the bathhouses given their value, creating systems of education and 
self-regulation that differentiated among various forms of sexual practice 
rather than entirely shuttering a site so critical to queer identities. While the 
bathhouses were private business enterprises and the closings constituted a 
taking from business owners, this essay moved beyond this conventional 
taking to draw attention to how these institutions served gay male commu-
nities by providing spaces for intimacy, kinship, and safety. These closures 
had either the unintentional or deliberate effect of destroying community, 
depriving gay men an important source of emotional sustenance and con-
nection, and ignoring the community-based work accomplished, thereby 
showcasing how state authorities infantilized gay men.
Gay men, in their attempts to respond to the HIV crisis with little to no 
support from public authorities, developed methods of regulating bathhouse 
116. See Lisa Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism, in
MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175 (Russ Castronovo & 
Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002).
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usage. Such innovation was disregarded by authorities who refused to 
acknowledge the dynamic character of these physical spaces and instead 
rendered them diseased locales in which nothing productive could occur. 
They flattened the diverse dimensions of bathhouse culture, ignored intra-
communal efforts that preceded state-directed ones, and—ultimately—
painted gay men as depraved, oversexed animals incapable of responding 
to the crisis. When we examine the archival evidence of the gay male 
community’s thoughtful, detailed plans to self-regulate and their subse-
quent progress and then cross-reference those findings with the state’s own 
efforts and the state’s simultaneous mischaracterization of supposed gay 
male inertia, it becomes clear that both parties achieved similar results 
without equal authority or credit. In fact, the community and the state-
sponsored actions have much in common, but the fundamental difference is 
that the state had different goals and strategies. Instead of approaching the 
bathhouses with an ethos of care and attention to the logic that shaped the 
spaces, the state continued its historical assault on gay male bodies and 
spaces by deploying a narrative of public health to destroy an “eyesore” 
despised long before the onset of HIV/AIDS. In short, the state’s efforts 
were overwhelming political as evidenced by their neglect to heed scien-
tific advice and their unwillingness to distinguish between particular sex 
acts and the locales in which sex acts might take place. The community, 
however, tried to balance health and wellness with the tenets of sexual 
freedom to produce a sound and communally-specific public health ap-
proach. Unfortunately, the state’s public health narrative received traction, 
while the community’s efforts were disregarded and erased. As a result, the 
state achieved their pre-calculated goals to eradicate these troubling queer 
counterpublics and emerged as champions of public health. In other words, 
these closures did substantial cultural and political work as part of a larger 
anti-gay and anti-HIV cultural discourse that dehumanized and infantilized
men who have sex with other men. The closings fostered and perpetuated a 
narrative of culpability, ignited intense divisions within the gay and lesbian 
communities, and produced within gay men a deep distrust and even fear of 
governing institutions and of one another.
Appropriate dignity restoration requires that bathhouses be reconcep-
tualized as critical resources for safety and connection, for queer kinship 
and community. Two apologies to the LGBTQ communities issued only a 
few months after Hillary Clinton offered hers are exemplary in this regard. 
First, on June 22, 2016, the Toronto Police Chief, Mark Saunders, apolo-
gized for the event that catalyzed the first gay pride parade in Toronto: the 
raiding of four Toronto gay bathhouses in one night and the arrest of 286 
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patrons in February 1981. Saunders’ statement recognized how the state 
action assaulted dignity: “The 35th anniversary of the 1981 raids is a time 
when the Toronto Police Service expresses its regrets for those very ac-
tions. It is also an occasion to acknowledge the lessons learned about the 
risks of treating any part of Toronto’s many communities as not fully a part 
of society.”117
Second, five months after Clinton’s gaffe, the Prime Minister of Can-
ada, Justin Trudeau, announced an intent to apologize “on behalf of all 
Canadians to those who were imprisoned, fired from their jobs or otherwise 
persecuted in the past because of their sexuality.”118 The apology is part of 
a set of reforms that the Trudeau administration is undertaking following a 
report drafted by Egale, a Canadian interest group for sexual minorities. 
The report calls for dignity-restorative measures, such as apologizing to all 
arrested for homosexuality prior to its decriminalization in Canada in 1969, 
apologizing to all dismissed from public and military service due to their 
sexuality, evaluating whether compensation is feasible for those who suf-
fered past discrimination for their sexuality, and eliminating all laws that 
criminalize those who visit a bathhouse.119 The apology and proposed re-
forms are notable because they highlight why Clinton’s apology falls short. 
Trudeau’s apology was not reactive. It was not compelled under duress, 
and it was not issued within a competitive electoral context. Furthermore, 
Clinton’s policy objectives—ranging from securing equal treatment for 
same-sex couples to access to the anti-HIV medication known as Pre-
Exposure Prophylaxis or PrEP—are premised upon heteronormative no-
tions of sexual intimacy and dignity. Egale’s objectives do not contain this 
heteronormative bias. The explicit demand for elimination of laws that 
impede the sexual kinship at the bathhouse suggests the very engagement 
with queer logics that both the dignity-taking ignored and that the dignity-
restoration pursued by U.S. state officials lacks.
By contrasting the U.S. and Canadian efforts to restore dignity, we can 
approach a theory of appropriate dignity restoration for LGBTQ communi-
ties. Such restoration can likely follow only if officials adopt policies in-
formed by “benign sexual variation” or if sexual subcultures can be 
117. Toronto Police Chief Mark Saunders Apologizes for 1981 Gay Bathhouse Raids, CBC NEWS
(June 22, 2016, 4:50 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/police-apology-raids-1.3647668 
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recognized in a non-hierarchical way.120 One of the largest mistakes that 
characterize responses to HIV/AIDS remains the profound collision of 
politics and public health or the deployment of a life-threatening virus to do
substantial cultural and political work against a subjugated community. If 
we hope to achieve something that resembles restoration, appropriate gov-
erning bodies would need to depoliticize public health policies, meaning a 
thoughtful reconsideration of what constitutes sexual health and who gets 
to decide. Additionally, these efforts should contest the privatization of 
health resources and, more broadly, resist heteronormativity as the frame-
work through which gay rights/gay identity achieves legibility and appro-
bation. Finally, restoration must involve a revaluation of community-
building habits and kinship structures that do not bolster heteronormative 
logics. Similar to the Canadian government’s proposed plans to begin mak-
ing amends, U.S. governing authorities should issue an unprompted apolo-
gy that takes accountability for the harm inflicted and do the necessary 
work to offer respect, inclusion, and protection. Whether or not complete 
restoration can be provided by the very authorities responsible for the tak-
ings is debatable. Nevertheless, dignity restoration cannot be contingent on 
the abandonment of queer ways of knowing and being and thereby requir-
ing the wholesale adoption of the heteronormative logics that stripped us of 
dignity initially. A more thoughtful strategy rooted in the recognition of 
queer particularity is perhaps the only route toward fuller dignity restora-
tion, and maybe it is the best we can hope for.
120. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 283 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992).
